On October 11, 1899, the Second Boer War broke out after the British failed to accept the Transvaal Ultimatum. This order that all remnant British forces of the First Boer War return to Britain, and that all British forces would withdraw from the South African colony. In the beginning of the war, the now Afrikaners fighting for Independence of their country attacked several English settlements, such as Ladysmith, Kimberley, and Mafeking. The Boer freedom-fighters used then state of the art tactics such as an impressive uniform of camouflage, to gain the upper hand on many British soldiers. Three months later, the Boer offensive began collapsing in front of them. It was over the next six months that the British felt the sting of victory. They began to recapture their cities, but at a cost. British morale at home was strengthened however, especially when the relief of Mafeking in July 1900 forced the Boers to retreat even deeper. This made the commander of the relief garrison, Colonel Robert Baden-Powell an instant war hero. Many of these freedom fighting burghers surrendered. With more than a third of the total Boer fighting force defeated, Britain had thought they had won just another quick war in one of their colonies. But the rest of the Boer forces were tactfully commanded and engaged in a two year long guerilla war. The British Cavalry proved useless here as the Boer fights countlessly attacked weak points in the British army, especially by crippling their lines of communication. Throughout this time, more than 20,000 Boer fights continued to wreak havoc on the British settlements. Standard rules of war were lost here, and the British often retaliated with such tactics as concentration camps or scorched earth war policies. These policies were so destructive, that this conflict remains “the most terrible and destructive modern armed conflict in South Africa’s history” (South African History Online).It was not that Lord Alfred Kitchener adopted his three fold strategy to win the war. The first two of these strategies included the camps and the burning of countless Boer settlements to try and starve out the guerilla resistors. He believed by destroying as much of the South African farmland and family life as possible, the threats of those freedom fighters would soon diminish. Due to the lack of overall care in the systems implemented to win the war, many natives of South Africa starved and died. Further issues became apparent during the conflict as many African fighters for Britain who remained in South Africa were subjected to Kitchener’s “anglicisation” policy. Many of these policies became implemented into the South African Apartheid System.
All in all, Britain had not seen a type of war such as this. In recent decades, their conflicts had been with other third world countries who would be totally out-manned and out-strategized. The Boer fighters were able to outmaneuver the famed British cavalry. They would attack and run away so quickly that a “proper cavalry charge...was no use if you couldn’t even find the enemy” (Hochschild 33). And just as these attacks persisted, the British shock and awe burning of farmland would then follow. It was true now, that no one could have “imagined that fifteen years later this would be the face of war in Europe as well” (Hochschild 33). This form of war would not only get more violent, but nation upon nation would later devastate each other’s lines with scorched earth and air. It almost makes you imagine that if the Boer’s had capable numbers and technology, we could have witnessed the true foreshadowing of stalemates that was to come. The overuse of British cavalry allowed the Boer fighters to use natural terrain to stop their charge, and to force stalemates. Of course through this whole conflict, everyone failed to “pay attention to the machine gun” (Hochschild 26). A patriotic many, such as Rudyard Kipling, saw this war as a test of British might. Early on the conflict, most would have agreed. But they failed to deal with the Boer’s effectively on many fronts. No matter what, both the “Germans and the British were thinking of this war on the African plains as a rehearsal for a greater conflict.
In this conflict, a conscious observer to war tactics would see that upon two forces matched against one another, the machine would create a great difficulty in gaining serious ground. Traditional charges of flesh and horse would not longer work in this situation. Britain knew they were going to win the conflict eventually, and just through their endless numbers of souls at the guerilla fighters. They knew one day that the Boer’s were to lose on number alone. But how would they fare against a country of millions. If Britain was to struggle so, against a third world colony nonetheless, well this only foreshadows the struggles to come. As it turned out, many high ranking officials saw this British imperfection in terms of overall physical deterioration. More than 20,000 British and 14,000 Boer lives were lost (Britannica). These numbers may seem small, but for such a small conflict these numbers foreshadow the losses that would come over a dozen years later. What is worse is that 100,000 lives were lost because of British scorched earth and concentration camp policies. What is to be gained here is that war is growing. Not only are more individuals involved, but the enterprise needs so much organization and will power, that if not properly dealt with, more lives will be lost away from the front lines. These losses only made the patrio-fenetic response to the relief of Mafeking even more striking. Internationally, the war made Britain look like a feeble international power ready to turn their backs on their colonies at a moment’s notice. At home, the 1900 khaki election had allowed the conservatives to take over British politics. When news came out concerning the true nature of the war, the British public became to adopt an anti-war sentiment, and a year later in parliament, many attacks were made on behalf of many liberals, including David Lloyd George and John Ellis. Further outcry was made when Emily Hobhouse visited the now dilapidated country and took first hand accounts of such atrocities as the camps. There did not exist a huge outcry for the anti war sentiment, but the fact that it was existent and talked about forced a response. Many blamed aggressive war tactics, but most found the excuse to be in the overall deterioration of the British military force. In the years to follow the Boer war, many, including Baden-Powell, would take necessary steps to ensure that at the eve of the next conflict, no matter the cost, Britain would be ready. Whether by 1914, this was true or not, Britain was off to a far greater conflict; a conflict that would again redefine war itself.
All in all, Britain had not seen a type of war such as this. In recent decades, their conflicts had been with other third world countries who would be totally out-manned and out-strategized. The Boer fighters were able to outmaneuver the famed British cavalry. They would attack and run away so quickly that a “proper cavalry charge...was no use if you couldn’t even find the enemy” (Hochschild 33). And just as these attacks persisted, the British shock and awe burning of farmland would then follow. It was true now, that no one could have “imagined that fifteen years later this would be the face of war in Europe as well” (Hochschild 33). This form of war would not only get more violent, but nation upon nation would later devastate each other’s lines with scorched earth and air. It almost makes you imagine that if the Boer’s had capable numbers and technology, we could have witnessed the true foreshadowing of stalemates that was to come. The overuse of British cavalry allowed the Boer fighters to use natural terrain to stop their charge, and to force stalemates. Of course through this whole conflict, everyone failed to “pay attention to the machine gun” (Hochschild 26). A patriotic many, such as Rudyard Kipling, saw this war as a test of British might. Early on the conflict, most would have agreed. But they failed to deal with the Boer’s effectively on many fronts. No matter what, both the “Germans and the British were thinking of this war on the African plains as a rehearsal for a greater conflict.
In this conflict, a conscious observer to war tactics would see that upon two forces matched against one another, the machine would create a great difficulty in gaining serious ground. Traditional charges of flesh and horse would not longer work in this situation. Britain knew they were going to win the conflict eventually, and just through their endless numbers of souls at the guerilla fighters. They knew one day that the Boer’s were to lose on number alone. But how would they fare against a country of millions. If Britain was to struggle so, against a third world colony nonetheless, well this only foreshadows the struggles to come. As it turned out, many high ranking officials saw this British imperfection in terms of overall physical deterioration. More than 20,000 British and 14,000 Boer lives were lost (Britannica). These numbers may seem small, but for such a small conflict these numbers foreshadow the losses that would come over a dozen years later. What is worse is that 100,000 lives were lost because of British scorched earth and concentration camp policies. What is to be gained here is that war is growing. Not only are more individuals involved, but the enterprise needs so much organization and will power, that if not properly dealt with, more lives will be lost away from the front lines. These losses only made the patrio-fenetic response to the relief of Mafeking even more striking. Internationally, the war made Britain look like a feeble international power ready to turn their backs on their colonies at a moment’s notice. At home, the 1900 khaki election had allowed the conservatives to take over British politics. When news came out concerning the true nature of the war, the British public became to adopt an anti-war sentiment, and a year later in parliament, many attacks were made on behalf of many liberals, including David Lloyd George and John Ellis. Further outcry was made when Emily Hobhouse visited the now dilapidated country and took first hand accounts of such atrocities as the camps. There did not exist a huge outcry for the anti war sentiment, but the fact that it was existent and talked about forced a response. Many blamed aggressive war tactics, but most found the excuse to be in the overall deterioration of the British military force. In the years to follow the Boer war, many, including Baden-Powell, would take necessary steps to ensure that at the eve of the next conflict, no matter the cost, Britain would be ready. Whether by 1914, this was true or not, Britain was off to a far greater conflict; a conflict that would again redefine war itself.